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Abstract—Cryptographic algorithms are used to protect sensitive 
information when the communication medium is not secure. 
Unfortunately, the hardware implementation of these 
cryptographic algorithms allows secret key retrieval using 
different forms of attacks based on the observation of key-related 
information: physical information (side-channel attacks), faulty 
behaviors (fault-based attacks), or internal states (DFT-based 
attacks) for instance. Dedicated design for security techniques 
have been proposed so far, ranging from the development of 
specific cell libraries to the implementation of extra functions for 
preventing the leakage of useful information for key 
identification. On the other hand, users can expect high quality 
product for secure applications and this expectation requires the 
development of test solutions for every component of the secure 
device. However, testing those devices faces a double dilemma: (i) 
how to test and, possibly, develop design-for-testability schemes 
providing high testability (high controllability/observability) 
while maintaining high security (no leakage), (ii) how to provide 
high security using dedicated design rules while maintaining high 
testability. This tutorial will address these issues presenting the 
security weaknesses generated by classical DFT techniques, pros 
and cons of security-dedicated DFT, BIST and Fault tolerance 
solutions, and impact of design for security techniques on 
testability 
Keywords: BIST, DFT, secure systems, cryptographic cores. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Many secure systems such as smartcards include hardware 
implementation of symmetric cryptographic algorithms such as 
(Triple) Data Encryption Standard and Advanced Encryption 
Standard.  
From a mathematical point of view, a cryptographic 
algorithm is a function that allows ciphering an input text (also 
called plaintext) by using a secret key. All classical attacks 
(i.e., cryptanalysis) try to find some correlations between the 
input and the output of that function in such a way to discover 
some hidden relations that would allow retrieving the secret 
key. The secret keys used to encrypt the data with these 
algorithms are large enough to prevent any brute force attack 
that consists in exploring the whole solution space (2n with 
64<n<256). However, the hardware implementation of these 
cryptographic algorithms allows the hackers to measure the 
observable characteristics of the physical implementation and 
deduce the secret key (side-channel attacks). Besides, new 
other issues arise concerning to the reliability of the device. In 
particular, a broken device could deliver erroneous results and 
data that would hazard the security of the whole system. 
The first part of the tutorial focuses on attacks based on the 
observation of the scan chains. These scan chains, which aim to 
provide full controllability and observability of internal states, 
are against the principle of security that requires minimal 
controllability and observability. Details about scan-based 
techniques for secure cores are described, such as secure scan-
chain controller, detection of unauthorized scan shift by test 
pattern watermarking, spy flip flops, scan enable tree 
inspection, and data confusion. 
The second part of the tutorial analyzes BIST solutions for 
permanent faults. It will be shown how crypto-devices are well 
suitable for this type of test. Indeed, from one side BIST 
approaches are effective for secure circuits since they do not 
rely on visible scan chains, thus preventing scan-based attacks. 
Moreover, it is shown how particular characteristics of crypto-
devices allow very effective pseudo random tests. 
The third part of the tutorial will analyze on-line BIST 
solutions to increase the fault tolerance of such devices, in 
particular against fault attacks. This attack is based on the 
intentional injection of faults (for instance by using a laser 
beam) into the system while an encryption occurs. By 
comparing the outputs of the circuits with and without the 
injection of the fault, it is possible to identify the secret key. To 
face this problem we analyze how to use error detection and 
correction codes as counter measure.  
Since dedicated design for security techniques have been 
proposed so far (e.g., development of specific secure cell 
libraries, or implementation of extra functions for preventing 
the leakage of useful information for key identification), we 
eventually discuss perspectives and trends in digital testing of 
such dedicated components. 
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